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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATUREfc)FPROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987).

This actioji is a petition for

review of the Order of the Industrial Commission regarding
Appellant's (hereafter "Plaintiff's") application for benefits due
under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, UTA|H CODE ANN. § 35-1-1,
et seg. (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 0N APPEAL
I.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled | to receive temporary

total disability benefits after reaching medical stabilization.
II.

Whether the Industrial Commission's determination

of the extent of Plaintiff's permanent partial disability was made
without the support of substantial evidence.
III.

Whether Plaintiff is entitled to a hearing

regarding the medical panel's report when hei failed to request one
or to raise the issue below.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-65 (1981), s^t out in full in the
Addendum.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-77 (1982), s£t out in full in the
Addendum.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-82.51 (1965)|, set out in full in
the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is brpught on a petition for review of an Order
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Workers' Compensation
Division.

Plaintiff suffered an industrial accident on August 17,

1983, while employed by Howard Foley Company.

(R. 229-230).

He

suffered lacerations to the back of his head, injured his neck,
and was bruised when the backhoe he was operating fell over and
rolled down the slope on which he was working.

(R. 230). On

August 10, 1986, Plaintiff signed an application for hearing
seeking a determination of continuing temporary total disability,
a referral to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, and a
determination of his permanent partial disability.

(R. 6-7).

hearing was held on these issues on December 10, 1986.

A

(R. 25-71).

At that time, the medical evidence in the record at pages R.
72-189 was admitted.

After the hearing, the matter was referred

to a medical panel, whose report is included in the record at R.
207-218, 221-223.

The medical panel considered all of the other

medical evidence in the record, and the panel concluded that
Plaintiff's condition had stabilized as of July 21, 1986, and that
his total permanent impairment was 18.5% resulting from the
industrial accident and 4.5% resulting from pre-existing
impairment.

(R. 212, 214-15).

Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Medical Panel Report.
(R. 224-227).

In it, he objected to three things:

the extent of

the medical panel's rating for cervical spondolysis, the extent of
the impairment rating for the right hand, and the determination
that the hearing loss was entirely pre-existing.
-2-

Most of the

Objection to the Medical Panel Report was directed to this third
point.

J

The Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order, dated May 29, 1987, and found that
an industrial accident had indeed occurred and adopted the medical
panel's findings as his own regarding the extent of Plaintiff's
disability.

The Judge also found that stabilization had occurred

as of July 21, 1986.

(R. 228-235).

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Review,! dated June 11, 1987.
(R. 236-38).

In it, he again complained of tlhe determination of

permanent disability relating to the cervical) spine injury,
indirectly again raised his objection to the determination of a
one percent (1%) impairment due to the injuryi to the right hand,
and again raised his claim which was presented and rejected at the
hearing that Plaintiff was entitled to temporary total disability
i

payments until he could be retrained.

Nowhere in the Motion for

Review did Plaintiff argue that he was entit: ed to a hearing
regarding the medical panel's report, or in ^ny way request such a
hearing.
The Industrial Commission issued an Order denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Review on August 9, 1 |987.

(R. 244-46).

In

it, the Commission determined that the Admin istrative Law Judge
acted correctly in using the date of stabili zation as the date on
which temporary total compensation ends, andj in adopting the
medical panel's findings regarding the exteri t of the Plaintiff's
disability.

Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Review to this

Court on August 27, 1987, alleging that Plaintiff "is entitled to
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a higher impairment rating for his cervical injuries based upon
the weight of the credible evidence presented."

He further

alleges he is entitled to temporary total disability payments
until he can be retrained.

(R. 248-49).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff is not entitled to temporary total disability
benefits after he reaches medical stabilization.

Once an

applicant recovers sufficiently to become medically stable, he or
she is eligible for permanent disability benefits, but is no
longer entitled to temporary total disability benefits.

This case

is controlled by Booms v. Rapp Construction Co., 720 P.2d 1363
(Utah 1986), and its rule should not be altered.
Plaintiff's permanent partial disability rating is a
finding of fact by the Industrial Commission.

Plaintiff fails to

show how the Industrial Commission's decision was incorrect under
the applicable standard of review.

The Industrial Commission's

determination was supported by substantial evidence, and should
not be upset by this Court.
Finally, Plaintiff has no right to a hearing he did not
request.

This issue was not raised below and should not properly

be considered on appeal.

Moreover, Plaintiff's failure to request

a hearing waived any claim to such a hearing and precludes any
error by the Industrial Commission on this issue.
permits such hearings but does not mandate them.

The statute
The Industrial

Commission did not wrongfully deny Plaintiff a hearing on the
credibility of the medical evidence, he did not even request such
-4-

a hearing.

The Industrial Commission's failure to act in such a

situation cannot be considered error.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TpTAL BENEFITS PAST
THE DATE OF MEDICAL STABILIZATION
A.

Utah Law Is Clear that Plaintiff Is Not Entitled
to Temporary Benefits Once He Becomes Eligible
for Permanent Benefits.
Plaintiff's first claim of error is (that he is entitled

to temporary total disability benefits until he is retrained,
since he cannot return to his former employment and is unable to
find employment.

This claim was directly dea It with by the Utah

Supreme Court in Booms v. Rapp Construction go., 720 P.2d 1363
(Utah 1986).

There the Court stated:

The first issue raised on appeal is whether
the Industrial Commission can terminate temporary
total disability benefits after a finding of
medical stabilization without making a finding
that the worker is able to return to work.
720 P.2d at 1365.

The Court concluded that 'the Commission is not

required to make findings of ability to work when, as in this
case, it makes an award for permanent partial disability."
1366, n. 2.

That is exactly what occurred in this case.

Id.,

at

The

Commission awarded the Plaintiff permanent partial disability
benefits and he is seeking continued temporary total benefits
after the date of medical stabilization because he claims that he
is not able to work.

Just as no finding of ability to work is

necessary for the Commission to terminate temporary total
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benefits, neither is the Commission required to determine that the
applicant is adequately trained to return to work before ending
temporary total benefits, at least if it awards permanent
disability benefits.
The Court in Booms stated that:
(t)he purpose of those (temporary total
disability) benefits is to "provide income for an
employee during the time of recuperation from his
injury and until his condition has stabilized."
. . . Thus, temporary total disability benefits
are to continue until the Commission determines
that the disability fits into another disability
classification or until benefits have been paid
for the statutory maximum of 312 weeks.
Id. at 1366 (quoting Entwistle Co. v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 at 497
(Utah 1981)).

In this case, the Commission properly determined

that the Plaintiff fit into another disability classification,
permanent partial disability, and terminated his temporary total
benefits.
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Booms' analysis of the
structure of the Workers* Compensation Statute in Johnson v.
Harsco/Heckett, 737 P.2d 986 (Utah 1987).

The Court summarized

that structure stating:
Moreover, the result Plaintiff urges is
inconsistent with the statutory structure which
provides for both temporary and permanent
benefits. In this regard, under Utah's workers'
compensation statutes, there are four categories
of disability, each controlled by a separate
statutory provision. The common denominator for
compensation under each category is the loss of
employability resulting from the injury.
Generally, temporary total disability benefits
are awarded when an individual suffers a
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job-related injury that prevents him or her from
returning to work. These benefits continue until
the Commission determines that the d isability
fits into another classification or until benefits
have been paid for the statutory min imum of 312
weeks. Determination of the tempora ry or
permanent nature of a disability is typically
made when the claimant reaches medic al stabilization. Once stabilization has occu rred and the
claimant moves from temporary to permanent
status, "he is no longer eligible fo r temporary
benefits." Therefore to award Plaintiff temporary total disability compensation regardless of
the permanent nature of his impairment contravenes the statutory structure which provides for
both temporary and permanent benefits.
737 P.2d at 988 (footnotes omitted, quoting flooms, 720 P.2d at
1366).

Plaintiff does not dispute that he h^s reached medical

stabilization, neither does he claim that thef permanent partial
disability award was improper and should not have been given,
Instead, he claims that he should not only receive on-going
temporary total disability benefits, but that his permanent
partial disability benefits should be increased.

The Industrial

Commission acted properly in finding that Plaintiff had reached
medical stabilization and in awarding permanent benefits.
Plaintiff is not entitled to continue to receive temporary
benefits after he has been transferred to permanent status.
Therefore, Plaintiff's claim for additional temporary total
benefits must fail.
It should also be pointed out that |Ln this case,
Plaintiff is not being penalized for not requesting permanent
total disability benefits as intimated in Plaintiffs Brief.
is not eligible for such benefits.
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A consideration of the

He

relevant factors in determining permanent total disability shows
that Plaintiff fails to meet the standard.

He is too little

disabled for his age and education level to be permanently totally
disabled.

Instead, he was awarded permanent partial disability by

the Commission.

Plaintiff did not allege below and does not claim

on appeal that he is entitled to permanent total disability
benefits.
B.

Other Authorities Agree with Utah's Analysis.
The leading authority in the workers* compensation field

agrees with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis.

Professor Larson

discusses the four-way classification of disabilities which Utah
and many other states employ, and states that with regard to
temporary total disability awards,
The commonest question is: when does the
"healing period" end and "stabilization" occur?
The answer to this question determines in most
states when temporary benefits cease and when the
extent of permanent disability can be appraised,
for purposes of making either a permanent partial
or a permanent total award.
2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 57.12(b) (1983).
He goes on to state that "the issue may be a purely medical one."
Id. , § 57.12(c).

That is clearly the case in Utah under Booms,

which states that "identifying when the healing period has ended
does not require a finding of ability to work; stabilization is
strictly a medical question."

720 P.2d at 1367.

Professor Larson also addressed the problem Plaintiff
complains of in this case—where stabilization occurs but the
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claimant is unable to return to work.

After briticizing a

statutorily compelled result in Minnesota that a claimant is
entitled to get temporary total benefits until!1 he finds work, he
states:
Once the physical condition is stabi lized, the
question becomes: is the inability to get work
the result of the injury? If it is, the
straightforward approach would then be to find
the claimant permanently disabled byj his residual
impairment. If later the claimant g ets steady
employment, the case can be reopened
In the
meantime, the claimant is definitely! disabled in
the compensation sense, because his physical
impairment causes his unemployment; but at the
same time the disability cannot accii rately be
characterized as temporary, since it has become
stable and what remains is permanent
By the
process of elimination, one comes to a total
permanent award, subject of course t o reopening.
Id. § 57.12(d).

It is clear that Professor Larson would not agree

with Plaintiff's attempt to obtain continued temporary benefits
after medical stabilization in a state with both temporary and
permanent benefits.
C.

Plaintiff Fails To Show Contrary Ut$h Authority
Or To Disinguish Controlling Utah Decisions.
The cases cited in Plaintiff's brief are not helpful in

determining the issue before the Court and tljieir selection
evidences a fundamental misunderstanding of Utah's statutory
structure which provides for both temporary and permanent
benefits.

Plaintiff argues that since he is unable to return to

his former occupation, he is entitled under ^Jtah law to temporary
total benefits.

As support for this proposition, he cites a

number of Utah cases, every one of which deals with permanent
-9-

total disability, not temporary total disability.

The standard of

total disability discussed in the cases Plaintiff cites is for an
award of permanent total disability.

It is not applicable in

cases of temporary total disability, due to the different
standards used and purposes served by the categories.

Booms and

Johnson, supra, are controlling law as to when temporary total
disability benefits terminate, and they do not permit the award of
additional temporary benefits of any kind to Plaintiff in this
case since he has been transferred to permanent status.
Plaintiff also asserts that under Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977), a claimant is
entitled to temporary total benefits "until he is able to return
to work."

562 P.2d at 620. This is not controlling law in Utah.

Neither Booms (Utah 1986) nor Johnson (Utah 1987) can be read to
support the claim that an applicant is entitled to receive
temporary total benefits after he or she is moved to permanent
status, regardless of ability to work.

Booms expressly rejected

the argument that a claimant must be able to work before temporary
total benefits cease.

Therefore, the dicta in Ortega relied on by

Plaintiff has been implicitly overruled by more recent cases and
is of no weight.
Plaintiff asserts that he is unable to work.

If that is

true and he is not able to be retrained for any other job, then he
might become eligible for permanent total disability benefits.
The Industrial Commission retains jurisdiction over all its cases
and could impose such additional liability on the employer if the
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circumstances warrant.

If Plaintiff does turn out to be

permanently totally disabled, he will get his compensation.

If he

does not, then he is not entitled to more than the temporary total
disability benefits received during his period of healing and the
permanent partial disability compensation he was awarded as a
result of the permanent impairment he suffered from the accident.
To permit Plaintiff to receive additional temporary total
disability benefits would violate the letter, spirit and structure
of the workers' compensation statute, and dirjectly contradict the
Supreme Court's opinion in Booms.
Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish Booms, except
to refer to "the statute and case law . . . interpreting the
Worker's [sic] Compensation Act."

Appellantjs Brief, p.10.

As

discussed above, the structure of the Act requires that no
temporary benefits be awarded once the claimant reaches permanent
status, and the only Utah case law Plaintiff refers to are cases
involving permanent total disability awards, jwhich is not an issue
in this case.

There is no authority under Utah law to permit a

claimant to continue to receive temporary total benefits because
he is unable to return to work once he reaches medical
stabilization and is awarded permanent benef its under UTAH CODE
ANN. § 35-1-66 or 35-1-67.

Booms is control ling in this area, and

Plaintiff's first claim of error should be dismissed, affirming
the Order of the Industrial Commission.
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II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING AS TO THE EXTENT OF
PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND MAY NOT BE DISPLACED.
Plaintiff's second point on appeal is that he is entitled

to a higher impairment rating for his permanent partial disability.
It is well established that such a rating is a question of fact.
Entwistle Company v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495, at 498 (Utah 1981)
("The extent and duration of an employee's disability are
questions of fact to be determined by the Commission.").

While

Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt a different impairment rating,
it is clearly improper for this Court to make findings of fact.
Instead, its function is to determine if the Commission acted
properly in coming to its conclusions, and if not, to remand for
further action.

The standard of review of the Industrial

Commission's findings of fact is not, as Plaintiff's brief
discusses, whether they are supported by the most "credible"
evidence, but rather whether there is "substantial evidence" to
support the facts as found by the Commission.

As stated in

Entwistle,
We review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commission's findings, and when
there is substantial evidence to support the
facts as found by the Commission, its order will
not be disturbed.
626 P.2d at 498.
In this case, it is clear that there is substantial
evidence to support the Commission's findings as to the extent of
Plaintiff's impairment.

The Commission adopted the determination
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of the medical panel, which was in turn subst bntially the same
total amount of impairment as determined by D r. Orme.
The Utah Supreme Court recently deal t with a very similar
case in Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 10 9 (Utah 1986).

There

the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted ce|rtain medical benefits
and temporary total disability benefits, but denied claims for
additional temporary total benefits and permd nent partial
benefits.

The Court affirmed this determination and stated

. . . this Court will not disturb the findings
and orders of the Commission unless they are
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitary
and capricious when they are contrary to the
evidence or without any reasonable oasis in the
evidence. Plaintiff argues, in essence, that the
findings in this case are arbitraryiand
capricious because the administrative law judge
adopted the findings of the medical panel rather
than those of Dr. Kimball, the treating physician.
732 P.2d at 111 (citations omitted).

After refusing to rule that

a treating physician's findings should be given preference as a
matter of law, the Court went on to find that the Commission's
adoption of the medical panel's report was not arbitrary and
capricious because it was supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, Plaintiff is, in essence, arguing that the
Commission's findings were arbitrary and cap ricious because the
administrative law judge adopted the finding s of the medical panel
rather than those of Dr. Orme, the independent medical examiner.
In this case, just as in Rushton, the medical 1 panel's report was
based on "not only its examination of and interview with
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Plaintiff, but also on the reports, test results, and x-rays from
the previous examinations of Plaintiff's treating physicians," 732
P.2d at 112, as well as of the independent medical examiners.

The

medical panel report (R. 207-218) refers to the reports of both
Dr. Baer and Dr. Orme, which are relied on by Plaintiff, as well
as the many other doctors who had seen Plaintiff.
The medical panel report drew approximately the same
overall conclusion regarding the total extent of Plaintiff's
permanent disability and the amount attributable to the industrial
accident as Dr. Orme, but divided the amount of impairment attributable to the various causes in a different manner.

As the

Industrial Commission stated in it's Order Denying Motion for
Review,
It is clear that, prior to hearing, there existed
considerable medical controversy regarding the
Plaintiff's overall permanent partial impairment.
It is the resolution of exactly this kind of
medical controversy that causes the need for
medical panels. The Commission considers it
entirely proper for the Administrative Law Judge
to rely on the medical panel findings absent some
good reason to believe the medical panel did not
thoroughly or impartially review the matter. In
this case, counsel for the applicant fails to
point out bias on the part of the medical panel
or their failure to consider all the evidence.
He simply states that the medical panel's rating
differs with that of two other doctors. The
Commission finds this is insufficient to suport
the contention that the Administrative Law Judge
erred in relying on the medical panel findings.
(R. 245-246).

The Defendant Employer and Insurer submit that the

Industrial Commission was correct, and that there is no reason to
upset the factual determination of the Commission.
-14-

Plaintiffs complaint is basically that he was not
awarded enough permanent partial disability for his back
problems.

The medical panel was chaired by Dr. Moress, a

neurologist/ and included Dr. Holbrook, an orthopedic surgeon.
They interviewed Plaintiff and had access to all his medical
records.

Their opinion regarding the extent of Plaintiff's

permanent disability due to his back problem^ is well-founded and
credible.

There is no indication that the pinel failed to

consider any of the medical evidence, and Plaintiff did not
present any additional medical evidence after the panel's report
or claim that the panel was in any way biased.

There is no reason

for this Court to determine that the Commission's conclusion
regarding the extent of Plaintiffs permanent partial disability
is not supported by substantial evidence is therefore proper.

The

Industrial Commission's determination of Plaintiffs permanent
partial disability should be affirmed.
III. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANOTHER HEARING IN THIS CASE,
A.

Plaintiff Failed to Raise This Issue Below and Cannot
Raise for the First Time on Appeal.
Plaintiff also argues that in the efvent the Court does

not overstep its function and make new findi|ngs of fact, as he
requests, he should be given a hearing regar ding the credibility
of the medical evidence.

Plaintiff did not request such a hearing

in his Objection to the Medical Panel's Repo|rt (R. 224-227), and
did not submit any other request, either wri tten or oral, for such
a hearing to the ALJ.

Moreover, he did not raise the issue
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in his Motion for Review to the Industrial Commission (R. 236-238).
Plaintiff even fails to raise it in the Petition for Review filed
with this Court, dated August 27, 1987 (R. 248-249).

The first

time the issue appears is in the Docketing Statement he filed with
this Court, dated September 16, 1987 (R. 251-253).
Utah law is well established that a party may not raise
an issue on appeal which was not presented for decision to the
trial court below.

See, e.g., Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah

1986); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d
1040 (Utah 1983).

While no Utah cases have been found on this

issue in the context of review of an administrative agency's
decision, the same principle should apply.
Professor Larson agrees with this proposition, stating:
. . . when the rule whose relaxation is in
question is more than a merely formal requirement
and touches substantial rights of fair play, the
relaxation is no more justified on a compensation
appeal than on any other. Such a rule is that
forbidding the raising on appeal of an issue that
has not been raised below or the revieval of an
issue that has been conceded, abandoned, or
otherwise resolved.
3 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 77A.83 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
Other states have also reached this conclusion.

In Lewis

v. Anaconda Company, 168 Mont. 463, 543 P.2d 1339 (1975), the
Montana Supreme Court noted in a footnote that the claimant could
not raise a constitutional question of due process for the first
time on appeal, and therefore did not consider it.

Similarly, in

Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 4 0 Pa. Commw. 117,
-16-

396 A.2d 905 (1979), the court stated that thb claimant could not
complain of the referee's actions if he had not raised the issue
to the Board.
Since Plaintiff failed to raise any ^laim of entitlement
to a second hearing to either the ALJ or the Commission, they did
not have an opportunity to rule on the issue, and Plaintiff should
be precluded from raising it now on appeal.
B.

Such a Hearing Is Permissive, Not Ma ndatory, and the
ALJ's Failure to Order Such a Hearing Without a Request
from any Party Cannot Be Error.
Even if the Court were to permit Pla intiff to raise this

issue for the first time in this appeal, there is no basis for
remand.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-77 (1982) states in pertinent part

that if objections are filed to a medical panel's report, Mthe
commission may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and
issues involved. . . ."

It is clear that a Rearing after the

medical panel submits its report is, under the 1982 amendment, not
mandatory, but within the discretion of the ALJ.

See, e.g. , Moore

v. American Coal Company, 737 P.2d 989 (Utah 1987) . Therefore,
mere failure to have a hearing which is not Mandated cannot be
error.

If Plaintiff had requested a hearing and been refused, he

would at least arguably have a claim that th^ ALJ had abused his
discretion in refusing to grant the hearing.| In this case,
however, there was no request for a second hearing to inquire into
the credibility of the medical panel's report, and the Court
cannot decide as a matter of law that the failure to provide a
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hearing is error when the legislature left that decision to the
discretion of the ALJ.
Plaintiff relies on UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-82.51 (1965),
which protects the parties' right to cross-examine.
denial of that right in this case.

There was no

Plaintiff did not request any

opportunity to cross-examine the members of the medical panel, as
§ 35-1-77 expressly provides, and cannot claim that his failure to
so request entitles him to a remand.

This case is analogous to a

case where an attorney fails to cross-examine at the hearing and
then attempts to complain on appeal that he was denied the
opportunity to cross-examination when in fact he did not take his
chance.

Plaintiff has waived any right to complain of the lack of

a second hearing in this case.

CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that Plaintiff's healing period ended
and that he had reached medical stabilization by, at the latest,
July 21, 1986.

The Booms case holds that eligibility for

temporary benefits ends upon stabilization and that no
determination of ability to work need be made.

It controls this

action and requires that the Commission's decision be affirmed as
to Plaintiff's first point, and that no additional temporary total
disability benefits be awarded during Plaintiff's rehabilitation.
Plaintiff also claims that he is entitled to a higher
permanent partial disability rating.

This determination of fact

by the Commission is based on substantial, credible evidence and
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may not be disturbed on appeal.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that he

is entitled to a second hearing to investigate the credibility of
the medical panel's report, despite the fact that he never
requested such a hearing.

That failure waives any claim of error

Plaintiff could have regarding this point.

Moreover, Plaintiff

failed to raise this issue below, or even in his Petition for
Review, and is precluded from asserting it noW on appeal.
Therefore, Plaintiff's appeal is without merit, and the Order of
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of January, 1988|.
RAY, QUINNEY| & NEBEKER

(C^'7y^)J? V ^ ^ * ^
Steven J. Ae schbacher
Attorneys fcjr Howard Foley Company
and the TiJ avelers Insurance
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four true and correct copies of the Brief of Respondents Travelers
and Howard Foley were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
S. Junior Baker
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
261 East 300 South, #350
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Erie V. Boorman
Attorney for Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Barbara Elicerio
Industrial Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, UT 84045-0580
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